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Abstract
Goal of this chapter is to describe the main solutions being devised for protecting
data confidentiality and integrity in outsourcing scenarios. In particular, we illustrate
approaches that guarantee data confidentiality by applying encryption or a combination
of encryption and fragmentation. We then focus on approaches that aim at guaranteeing
data integrity in storage and in query computation. Finally, we present some issues that
still need to be investigated for ensuring privacy and security of data outsourced to external
servers.
keywords : Data outsourcing, index, selective encryption, confidentiality constraint, frag-
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1 Introduction
The rapid advancements in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have brought
to the development of new computing paradigms, where the techniques for processing, storing,
communicating, sharing, and disseminating information have radically changed. Individuals
and organizations are more and more resorting to external servers [28] for the storage and the
efficient and reliable dissemination of information. The main consequence of this trend is the
development of a data outsourcing architecture on a wide scale. While data outsourcing intro-
duces many benefits in terms of management and availability of information, it also introduces
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new privacy and security concerns. In fact, data are no more under the direct control of their
owners, and their confidentiality and integrity may then be put at risk. The need for a proper
protection of outsourced data is also exacerbated by the sensitive nature of the information
collected and stored at external servers. Outsourced data often include sensitive information
(e.g., identifying information [8, 21, 22], financial data, health diagnosis) whose protection is
mandatory. Individuals as well as companies require the protection of their sensitive informa-
tion not only against external users breaking into the system but also against malicious insiders.
In many cases, the external server is relied upon for ensuring availability of data but should not
be allowed to read the data it stores. Protection must therefore be also ensured against possible
honest-but-curious servers, that is, servers that honestly manage data but may not be trusted
by the data owner to read their content. Ensuring effective and practical data protection in such
contexts is a complex task that requires to design effective approaches allowing data owners to
specify privacy requirements on data, and techniques for enforcing such requirements in data
storage and processing. Data privacy and integrity issues in outsourcing scenarios have then
captured the attention of the research community and several advancements have been pro-
posed (e.g., see [40]). The main goal of this chapter is to investigate different approaches that
have been proposed by the research community for protecting the confidentiality and integrity
of outsourced data. In particular, we consider a scenario where data are stored in relational
databases. The techniques discussed can however be adopted for protecting any kind of data.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes different approaches
for efficiently evaluating queries and enforcing access control policies over outsourced encrypted
data. Encryption, however, makes access to stored data inefficient because it is not always
possible to directly evaluate queries on encrypted data. Section 3 then describes alternative so-
lutions that grant data confidentiality and efficient query evaluation. These approaches model
privacy requirements through confidentiality constraints, and enforce them by combining frag-
mentation and encryption, and possibly involving the data owner for storing a limited portion
of sensitive data. Section 4 describes the main approaches for protecting data integrity in
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storage and query computation. Section 5 presents some open issues that are currently under
investigation by the research community for providing data privacy and integrity and for sup-
porting complex protection requirements in outsourcing scenarios. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the chapter.
2 Data encryption
A possible solution for protecting outsourced data from the server storing them consists in ap-
plying encryption. Encryption protects the exposure of sensitive information even if the server
is compromised and ensures integrity since data tampering can be detected. Clearly, data de-
cryption cannot be executed at the server side, and therefore solutions have been developed that
allow the external server to execute queries directly on the encrypted data. In the remainder
of this section, we first describe how data are stored at the external server and then illustrate
how query execution and access control are enforced.
2.1 Data organization
Data outsourcing typically involves four parties: a data owner is an organization (or an individ-
ual) who outsources her data to make them available for controlled external release; a user is a
person who can access the outsourced data; a client is the user’s front-end, which is in charge of
translating access requests formulated by the user in equivalent requests operating on the out-
sourced data; a server is the external third party that stores and manages the outsourced data.
We assume that the outsourced data are stored in a relational database. Before outsourcing
a plaintext database B, each relation in the database is mapped to an encrypted relation. In
principle, data can be encrypted by using either a symmetric or an asymmetric encryption func-
tion. However, since symmetric encryption is cheaper than asymmetric encryption, solutions
are typically based on symmetric encryption (e.g., [15, 24]). Data encryption can be applied at
different granularity levels: table, attribute, tuple, or cell. Table and attribute level encryption
3
Patients
SSN Name DoB County Diagnosis Prescription
782619730 Anne 55/01/23 Alameda HIV Nevirapine
946294626 Beth 86/04/05 Fresno Anemia Folic acid
737260262 Cheryl 40/12/23 Napa Arthritis Anti-inflammatory
937360965 Doris 81/07/22 Napa Diabetes Insulin
946259572 Evelyn 65/10/03 Orange HeartAttack Anticoagulants
837350362 Flora 89/03/24 Trinity Diabetes Insulin
(a)
Patientsk
tid etuple In Ib Ic Id
1 zKZlJxV α φ υ θ
2 AJvaAy1 β ς ι κ
3 AwLBAa1 γ χ λ µ
4 mHF/hd8 δ ς η π
5 HTGhoAq ǫ φ υ ρ
6 u292mdo ζ ς σ π
(b)
Figure 1: An example of plaintext relation (a) and the corresponding encrypted relation (b)
imply that the whole relation involved in a query should always be returned since the server
cannot select the data of interest, thus leaving to the client the burden of executing a query on
a potentially huge amount of data. Encryption at the cell level implies an excessive workload
for the client that needs to execute a possibly very large number of decrypt operations. For
these reasons, many proposals adopt encryption at the tuple level, since it represents a good
trade-off between encryption/decryption workload and query execution efficiency.
To directly query encrypted data, a set of indexes (e.g., [15, 24, 27]) are typically stored
with the encrypted relation. Indexes, whose values are computed starting from the plaintext
values of the attributes with which they are associated, allow the server storing the data to
partially evaluate clients’ queries (see Section 2.2). Each relation r in B defined over schema
R(A1, . . . ,An) is then mapped to an encrypted relation r
k over schema Rk(tid ,etuple, I i1 , . . . , I ij)
in the encrypted database Bk stored at the external server, with tid a numerical attribute
added to the encrypted relation and acting as a primary key for Rk; etuple the encrypted tuple;
I il, l = 1, . . . , j, index associated with the il-th attribute Ail in R on which conditions need to
be evaluated in the execution of queries. Each tuple t in r is mapped to a tuple tk in rk, where
tk[etuple] = Ek(t) and t
k[I il] = f(t[Ail]), l = 1, . . . , j, where E is an encryption function, k is
an encryption key, and f is an indexing function. The resulting encrypted relation rk contains
the same number of tuples as the plaintext relation r, since the number of tuples is not affected
by encryption and indexing.
Example 2.1. Consider plaintext relation Patients in Figure 1(a) and suppose that there
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Figure 2: Query evaluation process
is an index for attributes Name (In), DoB (Ib), County (Ic), and Diagnosis (Id). Figure 1(b)
illustrates the corresponding encrypted relation Patientsk, where index values are represented
with Greek letters. For readability, we report the tuples in the plaintext and encrypted relations
in the same order. Note, however, that the order in which tuples are stored in the encrypted
relation is independent from the order in which they appear in the plaintext relation.
2.2 Query execution
The introduction of indexes allows the server to partially evaluate a query q submitted by the
client. Figure 2 illustrates the query evaluation process. The original query q formulated by
the user (who may not be aware of the fact that data have been outsourced) on the plaintext
relation is sent to a trusted client (step 1). The client maps q into two queries: qs operates
on the encrypted relation using indexes, and qc operates on the result of qs. Query qs is then
communicated to the external server (step 2). The external server executes query qs on the
encrypted relation and returns the result to the client (step 3). The client decrypts the result
obtained from the server, and evaluates qc on the resulting relation to possibly remove spurious
tuples (i.e., tuples that do not belong to the final result), and returns the result to the user
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(step 4). Clearly, the translation of query q into queries qs and qc depends on the kind of indexes
involved in the query since different indexes support different queries (e.g., some indexes do
not support range queries and therefore they have to be executed at the client side). In the
following, we briefly describe the main indexing techniques.
• Encryption-based indexes (e.g., [15]). A simple approach consists in using as index the
result of an encryption function over the actual values. Given a tuple t in r, the value of
index I i, associated with attribute Ai for tuple t, is computed as Ek(t[Ai]), where Ek is
a symmetric encryption function and k the encryption key. This indexing technique has
the advantage of supporting equality queries, that is, queries with conditions of the form
Ai=v and Ai=Aj . In fact, these conditions can be translated into conditions I i=Ek(v) and
I i=I j, respectively, operating on the encrypted relation. Note that the index values for
attributes Ai and Aj must be computed using the same encryption function with the same
key. For instance, suppose that index I n in Figure 1(b) has been obtained by adopting
this method. Then, with reference to the plaintext and encrypted relations in Figure 1,
condition Name like ‘Evelyn’ will be translated as I n=‘ǫ’ on relation Patients
k. Since
encryption-based indexes preserve plaintext distinguishability, all the tuples returned by
the server belong to the result of the original query. As a drawback, this technique does
not easily support range queries, because encryption functions are not order preserving.
We note however that a range condition can be translated into a set of equality conditions,
one for each of the values in the range. For instance, a range condition Name like ‘[A–B]%’
is translated as I n=‘α’ or I n=‘β’.
• Partition-based indexes (e.g., [27]). The domain Di of attribute Ai is partitioned into
a set of non-overlapping subsets of contiguous values, which are usually of the same
size. Each partition is associated with a label that may or may not preserve the order
relationship characterizing values in Di. Given a tuple t in r, the value of index I i,
associated with attribute Ai for tuple t, is the label of the unique partition containing value
t[Ai]. For instance, index I b in Figure 1(b) is obtained by partitioning the domain [1910-
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01-01,2010-12-31] of attribute DoB in intervals of 20 years, and assigning, in the order,
labels ω, χ, φ, ς, and τ to the resulting partitions. This indexing method allows the server
side evaluation of equality conditions, by translating a condition of the form Ai=v into
condition I i=partition(v), where partition(v) is the label of the partition including value
v. Like for encryption-based indexes, this indexing technique supports the evaluation
of equality conditions between two attributes (i.e., Ai=Aj), provided that the attributes
are defined on the same domain and they have been indexed using the same partition.
Since an index value (i.e., the label associated with a partition) corresponds to different
plaintext values (i.e., all plaintext values belonging to the partition), the query result
computed by the server can include spurious tuples that need to be eliminated by the
client. For instance, with reference to the plaintext and encrypted relations in Figure 1,
condition DoB=‘86/04/05’ is translated as I b=‘ς’. The server therefore returns the second,
fourth, and sixth encrypted tuple. The client decrypts these three tuples, and eliminates
the latter two (whose presence is due to index collision) by reevaluating the condition on
plaintext data. Partition-based indexes do not easily support range queries. In fact, if the
index values are not order-preserving, a condition of the form Ai ≤ v is translated into
condition (I i = idx1)∨ . . .∨ (I i = idxm), where each value idxj , j = 1, . . . , m, is the label
of a partition including plaintext values that are lower than or equal to v. For instance,
condition DoB≤‘83/12/31’ is translated as I b=‘ω’ or I b=‘χ’ or I b=‘φ’ or I b=‘ς’.
• Hash-based indexes (e.g., [15]). Given a tuple t in r, the value of index I i, associated with
attribute Ai for tuple t, is computed as h(t[Ai]), where h is a hash function. The hash
function satisfies three properties: i) it is deterministic, meaning that given two values
v1 and v2 in the domain Di of attribute Ai, if v1 = v2 then h(v1) = h(v2); ii) it generates
collisions that happen when given two values v1 and v2 in the domain Di of attribute Ai,
with v1 6= v2, h(v1) = h(v2); and iii) it is not order preserving. A hash-based index allows
the server side evaluation of equality conditions of the form Ai=v and Ai=Aj that are
translated as I i=h(v) and as I i=I j, respectively (provided the hash function adopted to
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Figure 3: An example of B+tree index (a), its relational representation (b), and the corre-
sponding encrypted relation (c)
define I i is the same used to define I j). For instance, suppose that index I c in Figure 1(b)
has been obtained by adopting a hash-based indexing method. With reference to the
plaintext and encrypted relations in Figure 1, condition County=‘Fresno’ is translated as
I c=h(Fresno)=‘ι’. Since the hash function is not order preserving, hash-based indexes do
not easily support range queries.
• B+-tree indexes (e.g., [15]). A B+-tree data structure is used for indexing data. The
B+-tree index is built by the data owner over the original plaintext values of an attribute
Ai. The B+-tree is then encrypted at node level (i.e., each node of the B+-tree is en-
crypted as a whole) and stored at the server as a table with two attributes: id contains
the node identifier, and content contains an encrypted value representing the node con-
tent. Pointers to children are represented through cross references from the node content
to the node identifiers of its children in the table. For instance, Figure 3(a) illustrates
the B+-tree index built for attribute Name of relation Patients in Figure 1(a). Fig-
ure 3(b) illustrates the relation representing the B+-tree in Figure 3(a), and Figure 3(c)
illustrates the corresponding encrypted relation stored at the external server. B+-tree
indexes support both equality and range queries and, being order preserving, allow the
server to evaluate group by and order by SQL clauses. Since the B+-tree index is
encrypted, the traversal of the index can only be performed by the client. To execute
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a range query, the client has to perform a sequence of queries that retrieve tree nodes
at progressively deeper levels; when a leaf is reached, the node identifiers in the leaf can
be used to retrieve the tuples belonging to the interval. For instance, with reference to
the plaintext relation in Figure 1(a) and the index structure in Figure 3, condition Name
like ‘[D–Z]%’ (retrieving the names following ‘D’ in lexicographic order) is evaluated by
executing a set of queries for traversing the B+-tree along the path of nodes 1, 3, and 7.
Then, other queries will be produced to traverse the chain of leaves starting from node 7.
For each visited leaf, the client also retrieves the tuples associated with it (i.e., tuple t4
for leaf 7, tuple t5 for leaf 8, and tuple t6 for leaf 9).
• Order preserving encryption indexes (e.g., [2, 45]). Alternative approaches that support
equality and range queries are the Order Preserving Encryption Schema (OPES) [2] and
the Order Preserving Encryption with Splitting and Scaling (OPESS) schema [45]. OPES
is an encryption technique that takes as input a target distribution of index values and
applies an order preserving transformation in a way that the transformed values (i.e.,
the index values) follow the target distribution. Comparison operations can be directly
applied on the encrypted data, thus avoiding the production of spurious tuples. OPESS
adopts splitting and scaling techniques to create index values so that the frequency dis-
tribution of index values is flat (i.e., uniform).
• Privacy homomorphic indexes (e.g., [23, 26]). Although order preserving encryption tech-
niques permit the efficient evaluation of comparison operations, they do not support arith-
metic operations. As a consequence, the evaluation of aggregate functions (e.g., sum, avg)
cannot be delegated to the server. Privacy homomorphic encryption [38] allows the exe-
cution of basic arithmetic operations (i.e., +,−,×) over encrypted data. Their adoption in
the definition of indexes can then allow the server to directly evaluate aggregate functions
as well as execute equality and range queries [26]. As a drawback, the computation of
arithmetic operations over encrypted data is time consuming. Recently, in [23] a fully
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homomorphic encryption schema has been proposed that supports the computation of an
arbitrary function over encrypted data without the decryption key. While this schema
represents an important theoretical result, it cannot be used in real-world scenarios due
to its exponential computational complexity.
Besides the main indexing techniques illustrated above, many other solutions have been
proposed that aim at better supporting SQL clauses or at reducing the client workload in the
query evaluation process (e.g., [47]).
We conclude this overview on indexing techniques observing that the definition of an index
over an attribute must consider two conflicting requirements: on one hand, the index values
should be related to the corresponding plaintext data well enough to provide for an effective
query execution process; on the other hand, the relationship between indexes and plaintext
data should not open the door to inference and linking attacks. Different indexing methods
can provide a different trade-off between query execution efficiency and data protection from
inference. For instance, with an encryption-based index, index values reproduce exactly the
plaintext values distribution, thus opening the door to frequency-based attacks. An analysis
of the risk of exposure due to the publication of indexes is therefore an important aspect that
however only few proposals have considered. Also, as demonstrated in [7], even a limited
number of indexes can greatly facilitate the task for an adversary who wants to violate the
confidentiality provided by encryption.
2.3 Access control enforcement
The majority of the solutions developed in the data outsourcing scenario focus on the definition
of indexing techniques (e.g., [15, 24, 27]) and therefore no attention is posed on how data are
encrypted. Typically, data are assumed to be encrypted with a key that is shared among all
users that can access the data. As a consequence, all users knowing the encryption key can
access the whole outsourced database. This situation is clearly limiting in a real world scenario,
where different users may instead have different access privileges. However, the enforcement of
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t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
G 1 1 1 1 0 0
H 1 1 1 1 1 0
I 1 1 1 0 1 1
J 0 0 1 1 1 1
K 1 1 1 1 1 0
Figure 4: An example of access matrix
access restrictions cannot rely on the presence of a reference monitor (as in traditional systems)
at the external server since it is not trusted to enforce the policy itself. Also, access control
enforcement cannot be delegated to the data owner, since this practice presents the crucial
shortcoming that it requires the data owner to be always involved in the processing of every
access request. To overcome this issue, current proposals adopt a multi-key encryption schema
where different data are encrypted with different keys. Although this multi-key approach is
not new [32], the problem related to the definition, management, and evolution of the access
control policy, and therefore of the corresponding encryption, introduces new challenges. We
now discuss the proposals adopting a multi-key encryption schema for enforcing access control
on outsourced data [16, 17].
The data owner defines an access control policy stating who can read what resources (write
operations are performed at the owner’s site). Notations U and R are used to denote the
set of users and resources, respectively, in the system. Resources can be defined at different
granularity levels (e.g., a resource may be a relation, a tuple, or even a cell). The access control
policy is represented through an access matrix A, with a row for each user in U and a column
for each resource in R. Each cell A[ui,r j] can assume two values: 1, if ui is allowed to access r j;
0, otherwise. Given an access matrix A over a set U of users and a set R of resources, acl(r j)
denotes the access control list of resource r j (i.e., the set of users who can access r j).
Example 2.2. Consider relation Patients in Figure 1(a) and a set U={Gilda (G), Heidi (H),
Iris (I), Jessica (J), Kate (K)} of users. Figure 4 represents an example of an access matrix,
where, for example, acl(t1)={G,H,I,K}.
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A naive solution for enforcing access control through encryption consists in encrypting each
resource with a different key and communicating to each user the set of keys used to encrypt the
resources she can access. Such a solution is clearly unacceptable, since each user has to manage
as many keys as the number of resources she is authorized to access. To limit the number of
keys that each user needs to store and manage a key derivation method is adopted. Basically, a
key derivation method permits to compute an encryption key k i starting from the knowledge of
another key k j and a piece of publicly available information. Key derivation methods are based
on the definition of a key derivation hierarchy that specifies which keys can be derived from
other keys in the system. A key derivation hierarchy can be graphically represented through
a graph, with a vertex for each key and an edge from k i to k j iff k j can be directly derived
from k i. Since key derivation can be recursively applied, a path in the graph from k i to k j
represents the fact that key k j can be directly or indirectly derived from k i. The key derivation
methods proposed in the literature can be classified depending on the supported key derivation
hierarchy, which can be as follows.
• Chain of vertices (e.g., [41]): the key k j of a vertex is computed by applying a one-way
function to the key k i of its predecessor in the chain and no public information is needed.
• Tree hierarchy (e.g., [42]): the key k j of a vertex is computed by applying a one-way
function to the key k i of its direct ancestor in the tree and a publicly available label l j
associated with k j.
• DAG hierarchy (e.g., [3, 4, 5, 14, 18]): a key k j may have more than one direct ancestor
and therefore its derivation is typically based on techniques that are more complex than
the techniques used for chains and trees. Recent approaches [4, 5] working on DAGs are
based on the definition of a set of public tokens . Given two keys k i and k j, a token ti,j is
defined as ti,j=k j⊕f(k i,l j), where l j is a publicly available label associated with k j, ⊕ is
the bitwise xor operator, and f is a deterministic cryptographic function. Graphically,
each token ti,j represents an edge in the key derivation hierarchy, connecting vertex k i to
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vertex k j . Token ti,j allows the computation of k j through k i and l j . The existence of a
public token ti,j allows a user knowing k i to derive key k j through token ti,j and public
label l j.
Among the key derivation methods proposed in the literature, the technique in [4, 5] seems
the solution that better fits the outsourced scenario since it minimizes the need of re-encrypting
resources and generating new keys when the access control policy changes.
The access control policy defined by the data owner is then translated into an equivalent
encryption policy E , determining which data are encrypted with which key, the keys released
to users, and the key derivation hierarchy. An encryption policy E is equivalent to an access
control policy A if each user can decrypt all and only the resources she is authorized to access.
To define such an encryption policy, the idea is to exploit a key derivation hierarchy induced
by the set containment relationship ⊆ over U . This hierarchy has a vertex for each subset U of
users in U and a path from vertex v i to vertex v j if v i represents a subset of the users represented
by v j. The access control policy represented in A can be enforced by: i) assigning to each user
the key associated with the vertex representing the user in the hierarchy; and ii) encrypting
each resource with the key of the vertex corresponding to its access control list. In this way,
a key can possibly be used to encrypt more than one resource, since all the resources with the
same access control list are encrypted using the same key. Also, each user in the system has to
manage only one key. It is easy to see that the encryption policy defined as mentioned above
is equivalent to the access control policy defined by the data owner, since each user can derive
only the keys associated with vertices that represent sets of users to which the user belongs.
As a consequence, the user can only derive the keys used for encrypting resources for which she
possesses the access privilege [17].
Example 2.3. Consider the portion of the access matrix in Figure 4 that is defined on the set
U ′={G,H,I,J} of users. Figure 5 illustrates the key derivation hierarchy defined over U ′. For
readability, each vertex in the graph is associated with the set of users it represents. Here, dotted
edges represent the associations user-key and resource-key. The encryption policy represented by
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Figure 5: An example of encryption policy with a key hierarchy over U ′={G,H ,I,J}
this key derivation hierarchy is equivalent to the access control policy in Figure 4. User Gilda,
for example, knows key k 1 and therefore she can derive all and only the keys k i associated with
vertices in the hierarchy representing a set U of users including G (i.e., v 1, v 5-v 7, v 11-v 13, v 15).
She can therefore decrypt tuples t1, t2, t3, and t4, as defined by the access matrix in Figure 4.
Although this solution is simple and easy to implement, it defines more keys than actually
needed and requires the publication of a great number of tokens, which in turn makes key
derivation less efficient. In fact, the tokens are stored in a public catalog on the server to make
it available to any user. A key derivation then requires a series of client-server interactions. Since
the problem of minimizing the number of tokens in the encryption policy E , while guaranteeing
equivalence with the access control policy A is NP-hard (it can be reduced to the set cover
problem), in [17] the authors propose a heuristic algorithm working as follows.
• Initialization. The algorithm identifies the vertices necessary to enforce A, called material
vertices. Material vertices represent: i) singleton sets of users, whose keys are communi-
cated to the users and that allow them to derive the keys of the resources they are entitled
to access; and ii) the acls of the resources, whose keys are used for encryption.
• Covering. For each material vertex v corresponding to a non-singleton set of users, the
algorithm finds a set of material vertices that form a non-redundant set covering for v ,
which become direct ancestors of v . A set V of vertices is a set covering for v if for each
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u in v , there is at least a vertex v i in V such that u appears in v i. It is non redundant
if the removal of any vertex from V produces a set that does not cover v .
• Factorization. Whenever there is a set {v 1, . . . vm} of vertices that have n > 2 common
ancestors v′1, . . . , v
′
n, it is convenient to insert an intermediate vertex v representing all
the users in v′1, . . . , v
′
n and to connect each v
′
i, i = 1, . . . , n, with v , and v with each v j,
j = 1, . . . , m. In this way, the encryption policy includes n +m, instead of n ·m tokens
in the catalog.
Example 2.4. Consider the access control policy in Figure 4. During the initialization phase,
the algorithm identifies the material vertices represented in Figure 6(a). Vertices v 1, . . . , v 5
represent the encryption keys communicated to users, and vertices v 6, . . . , v 10 represent the
encryption keys used to protect resources. Figure 6(b) illustrates the key derivation hierarchy
resulting from the covering phase of the algorithm, which correctly enforces the access control
policy in Figure 4. It is easy to see that this hierarchy does not contain redundant edges.
Figure 6(c) represents the key derivation hierarchy resulting from the factorization of vertices
v 7 and v 8 that have three common direct ancestors (i.e., v 1, v 2, and v 5). To this purpose,
the algorithm inserts non material vertex v 11, representing the set GHK of users, in the key
derivation hierarchy. It then removes the 6 edges connecting v 1, v 2, and v 5 to v 7 and v 8, and
inserts 3 edges connecting v 1, v 2, and v 5 to v 11 and 2 edges connecting v 11 to v 7 and v 8. We
note that the hierarchy in Figure 6(b) has 15 edges, while the hierarchy in Figure 6(c) has 14
edges, thus saving one token.
Whenever there is a change in the access control policy, the key derivation hierarchy and the
resources involved in the change need to be appropriately updated. In particular, if the set of
users who can access a resource r changes due to a grant or revoke operation, the data owner has
to: download the encrypted version of r from the server; decrypt it; update the key derivation
hierarchy if there is not a vertex representing the new set of users in acl(r ); encrypt the resource
with the key k ′ associated with the vertex representing acl(r ); upload the new encrypted version
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Figure 6: An example of initialization (a), covering (b), and factorization (c) generating an
encryption policy equivalent to the access control policy in Figure 4
of r on the server; and possibly update the public catalog containing the tokens. To limit the
burden for the data owner for managing updates to the access control policy, in [16] the authors
propose a solution based on two layers of encryption, which partially delegates to the server the
management of policy update operations. The first layer of encryption, called Base Encryption
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Layer (BEL), is directly managed by the data owner, and enforces encryption on the resources
according to the policy existing at initialization time. The BEL is only updated by possibly
inserting tokens (i.e., edges in the key derivation hierarchy). The second layer of encryption,
called Surface Encryption Layer (SEL), is managed by the server under the supervision of the
data owner. The SEL is applied to encrypted resources, and enforces dynamic changes to the
policy by possibly re-encrypting resources and changing the SEL key derivation hierarchy to
correctly enforce updates of the access control policy. A user can then access a resource only if
she knows the keys used at the SEL and at the BEL to encrypt the resource. Note that, since
the server is in charge of managing the encryption of resources at the SEL, it may collude with
a user of the system to decrypt resources that neither the server nor the user can access. This
risk is limited, well defined, and can be reduced at the price of using a higher number of keys
at the BEL, to minimize the situations where, due to a grant operation, resources encrypted
with the same key at the BEL are encrypted with different keys at the SEL [17].
3 Fragmentation for protecting data confidentiality
The approaches described in Section 2 are based on the assumption that all data are sensitive
and therefore they are protected by applying a layer of encryption before outsourcing. Encrypt-
ing the whole dataset has however the disadvantage that it is not always possible to efficiently
execute queries and evaluate conditions over the encrypted data. Furthermore, often what is
sensitive is the association among data more than the data per se. Recent approaches have
therefore put forward the idea of using fragmentation for protecting data confidentiality and
limiting the use of encryption [1, 9, 12, 13]. In the following, we first describe the basic concepts
common to all the fragmentation-based proposals, and then present these proposals more in
details.
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3.1 Modeling confidentiality requirements
Given a relation r over relational schema R(A1, . . . ,An), with Ai an attribute on domain Di,
i = 1, . . . , n, confidentiality requirements are modeled through confidentiality constraints [1,
9, 12, 13]. A confidentiality constraint c over relation schema R(A1, . . . ,An) is a subset of
attributes in R (i.e., c ⊆ R). Confidentiality constraint c states that, for each tuple t∈r, the
(joint) visibility of the values of the attributes in c is sensitive and must be protected. While
simple, the definition of confidentiality constraints captures different protection requirements.
Confidentiality constraints can be classified as singleton or associations . A singleton constraint
states that the values of the attribute involved in the constraint are sensitive and cannot be
released. For instance, the SSN of patients of a given hospital must be protected from disclosure.
An association constraint states that the association among the values of the attributes in
the constraint is sensitive and cannot be released. For instance, the association between the
Name and the Diagnosis of a patient has to be protected from disclosure. The definition of
confidentiality constraints is a complex problem that should take into consideration possible
relationships among data. In this chapter, we assume that the data owner correctly defines
confidentiality constraints on her data.
A set C of confidentiality constraints is well defined if it is non redundant, that is, iff
∀ci, cj ∈ C, i 6= j, ci 6⊂ cj. Intuitively, a constraint ci such that ci⊆cj , with i 6= j, is redundant
since the satisfaction of cj implies the satisfaction of ci. Note that any subset of attributes in
cj that does not represent a confidentiality constraint can be released.
Example 3.1. Consider relation Patients in Figure 1(a), reported for simplicity in Fig-
ure 7(a). Figure 7(b) illustrates a set of well defined confidentiality constraints, modeling the
following confidentiality requirements:
• the list of SSNs of patients is considered sensitive (c0);
• the association of patients’ names with any other information in the relation is considered
sensitive (c1, . . . , c4);
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Patients
SSN Name DoB County Diagnosis Prescription
782619730 Anne 55/01/23 Alameda HIV Nevirapine
946294626 Beth 86/04/05 Fresno Anemia Folic acid
737260262 Cheryl 40/12/23 Napa Arthritis Anti-inflammatory
937360965 Doris 81/07/22 Napa Diabetes Insulin
946259572 Evelyn 65/10/03 Orange HeartAttack Anticoagulants
837350362 Flora 89/03/24 Trinity Diabetes Insulin
(a)
c0={SSN}
c1={Name,DoB}
c2={Name,County}
c3={Name,Diagnosis}
c4={Name,Prescription}
c5={DoB,County,Diagnosis}
c6={DoB,County,Prescription}
(b)
Figure 7: An example of relation (a) and of a set of well defined constraints over it (b)
• attributes DoB and County can work as a quasi-identifier [39] and therefore can be exploited
to infer the identity of patients; as a consequence, their associations with both Diagnosis
and Prescription are considered sensitive (c5 and c6).
Given a relation r defined over relation schema R(A1, . . . ,An), and a set C of confidentiality
constraints, the data owner has to outsource r in a way that all sensitive attributes and associ-
ations modeled by C are properly protected. The approaches proposed in the literature address
this problem by applying fragmentation, possibly combined with encoding techniques.
• Fragmentation consists in partitioning the attributes in relational schema R in different
subsets (called fragments), which are then possibly outsourced in place of r . Formally, a
fragment F i is a subset of the attributes in R (i.e., F i ⊆ R), and a fragmentation F is a set
of fragments (i.e., F = {F 1, . . . ,Fm}). Intuitively, fragmentation can be used to protect
sensitive associations, by storing the attributes composing c in different fragments.
• Encoding consists in obfuscating an attribute (set thereof) such that its values are intel-
ligible only to authorized users. Different solutions can be used to obfuscate attribute
values [1] (e.g., encryption). Intuitively, encoding can be used to protect both sensitive
values, by obfuscating them, or sensitive associations, by obfuscating at least one of the
attributes involved.
Current solutions differ in how they fragment the original relation and if and how they adopt
encoding to protect data confidentiality. In the remainder of this section, we will illustrate these
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solutions in more details, providing a description of how data are fragmented and how queries
can be executed on fragmented data.
3.2 Non-communicating servers
The first approach proposing the use of fragmentation combined with an encoding technique
to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information has been presented in [1].
3.2.1 Data organization
Confidentiality constraints are enforced by fragmenting the original relation R into two frag-
ments F 1 and F 2, stored at two non-communicating servers, who do not know each other.
These fragments are obtained by partitioning the attributes in R in such a way that the at-
tributes composing confidentiality constraints are not stored in the same fragment. Whenever
one of the attributes in R cannot be stored within one of the two fragments without violating a
confidentiality constraint, the attribute is encoded. The encoding of an attribute A∈R consists
in representing the values of the attribute with two different attributes A1 and A2 in F 1 and
F 2, respectively. The original values of attribute A can be reconstructed only by authorized
users, combining the values of attributes A1 and A2. For instance, A1 may contain a random
value rnd , and A2 the result of the xor between the original value of attribute A and rnd
(i.e., t[A]⊕ rnd). Only a user knowing both A1 and A2 can reconstruct the original values of
attribute A in R. A fragmentation F is then defined as a triple 〈F 1,F 2,E〉, where E is the
set of encoded attributes that are stored plaintext neither at F 1 nor at F 2. A fragmentation
F=〈F 1,F 2,E〉 is correct with respect to a set C of confidentiality constraints if ∀c∈C, c 6⊂F 1
and c 6⊂F 2. Adopting this fragmentation model, singleton constraints can only be enforced by
encoding the corresponding attribute. Association constraints can instead be satisfied by frag-
mentation, splitting the attributes in the constraints between F 1 and F 2. However, it is not
always possible to satisfy an association constraint via fragmentation since it may happen that
the attributes involved in an association constraint cannot be split between the two fragments
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F e1
tid SSN1 Name1 DoB Diagnosis Prescription
1 α η 55/01/23 HIV Nevirapine
2 β Θ 86/04/05 Anemia Folic acid
3 γ ι 40/12/23 Arthritis Anti-inflammatory
4 δ κ 81/07/22 Diabetes Insulin
5 ǫ Λ 65/10/03 HeartAttack Anticoagulants
6 ζ µ 89/03/24 Diabetes Insulin
F e2
tid SSN2 Name2 County
1 τ Ω Alameda
2 υ θ Fresno
3 φ σ Napa
4 χ λ Napa
5 ς ξ Orange
6 ω ς Trinity
Figure 8: An example of correct fragmentation in the non-communicating servers scenario
without violating another constraint. In this case, an attribute in the constraint needs to be
encrypted. We note that, besides correctness, F needs also to be complete, meaning that all
the attributes in R are stored either plaintext or encoded in F . Formally, a fragmentation
F=〈F 1,F 2,E〉 is complete with respect to R if R=F 1∪F 2∪E.
At the physical level, fragmentation F=〈F 1,F 2,E〉 with F 1 = {A11 , . . . ,A1i}, F 2 =
{A21 , . . . ,A2j}, and E = {Ae1, . . . ,Ael} translates into two physical fragments F
e
1 =
{tid,A11 , . . . ,A1i, A
1
e1
, . . . , A1el, } and F
e
2 = {tid,A21 , . . . ,A2j , A
2
e1
, . . . , A2el}. Attribute tid is
the primary key of both physical fragments and guarantees the lossless join property. It can be
either: 1) the key attribute of the original relation R, if it does not violate any confidentiality
constraint when stored in F 1 or in F 2, or 2) an attribute that is added to both F
e
1 and F
e
2.
The presence of this attribute guarantees the possibility, for authorized users, to reconstruct
the content of the original relation R.
Example 3.2. Consider relation Patients in Figure 7(a) and the set of confidentiality con-
straints over it in Figure 7(b). An example of correct and complete fragmentation is F={{DoB,
Diagnosis, Prescription}, {County}, {SSN, Name}}. Figure 8 illustrates the corresponding
physical fragments, where, for simplicity, obfuscated values are represented with Greek letters.
Constraint c0 is singleton and therefore can be satisfied only by obfuscating attribute SSN. Asso-
ciation constraints c1, . . . , c4 are satisfied by obfuscating attribute Name, and constraints c5 and
c6 are solved via fragmentation. We note that attribute Name cannot be stored in the clear in a
fragment without violating at least a constraint.
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In general, given a relation R and a set of well defined constraints C over it, different correct
and complete fragmentations may exist. As an example, the fragmentation F=〈F 1,F 2,E〉, with
E=R, that encodes all the attributes in R is always correct and complete. However, such a
solution is equivalent to encrypt the whole relation, thus nullifying the advantages that the
availability of data in clear form may have on query execution. Among all the fragmentations
of R that enforce C, the one minimizing query evaluation costs at the client side is then to be
preferred. To evaluate the query execution cost, in [1] the authors adopt an affinity matrix
M , with a row and a column for each attribute in R. Each entry M [Ai,Aj ] represents the cost
that would be paid in query evaluation if attributes Ai and Aj (i 6= j) are not stored in the
same fragment. Each entry M [Ai,Ai] represents the cost that would be paid if attribute Ai is
encoded (i.e., Ai∈E). As a consequence, the cost of a fragmentation F is defined as the sum
of the cells M [Ai,Aj] such that Ai∈F 1 and Aj∈F 2, and of the cells M [Ai,Ai] such that Ai∈E.
In [1] the authors show that the problem of computing a fragmentation with minimum cost
is NP-hard (the minimum hypergraph coloring problem reduces to it). They therefore propose
three different heuristics working in polynomial time in the number of attributes in R, which
are obtained by combining known approximation algorithms for the min-cut and the weighted
set cover problems.
3.2.2 Query execution
The query execution process must be revised to take into consideration the fact that relation
R is stored in two physical fragments F e1 and F
e
2 managed by two external servers S1 and S2,
respectively. Consider a query q of the form select A from R where Cond, where A is a
subset of attributes in R, and Cond =
∧
i condi is a conjunction of basic predicates of the form
(Ai op v), (Ai op Aj), or (Ai in {vi, . . . , vk}), where Ai, Aj ∈ R, {v, vi, . . . , vk} are constant
values in the domain of attribute Ai, and op is a comparison operator in {=, 6=, >,<,≥,≤}.
Query q is first reformulated as a query operating on the join between the two fragments F e1
and F e2. The query execution plan can then be determined by simply generalizing and applying
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the standard database optimization techniques. This implies that projections can be pushed
down to the servers, just taking care to not project out attribute tid necessary for the join
between F e1 and F
e
2. Selection conditions can be pushed down to the server storing the involved
attributes in clear form. More precisely, the conditions specified in the where clause are split
into: Conds1 that is the conjunction of all basic conditions that involve attributes stored in F
e
1
only; Conds2 that is the conjunction of all basic conditions that involve attributes stored in F
e
2
only; and Cond c that is the conjunction of all basic conditions defined on encoded attributes or
involving attributes that are not stored in the same fragment. Conditions Conds1 and Cond s2
can then be pushed down to servers S1 and S2, respectively, for their evaluation, while Cond c
can be executed only at the client side together with the join operation.
Once the logical plan has been optimized, it is necessary to determine the physical execution
plan that establishes how the query execution is partitioned among the two servers and the
client. To this purpose, the following two strategies can be applied.
• Parallel strategy . The two servers first evaluate conditions Cond s1 and Conds2, and then
the client computes the join between the results returned by the two external servers and
evaluates Cond c.
• Sequential strategy . One of the two external servers first evaluates condition Cond si and
returns the result to the client who, in turn, sends the projection over attribute tid to
the other storage server. The second server then evaluates Cond sj on the subset of tuples
indicated by the client. Finally, the client refines the result returned by Sj evaluating
Cond c.
The parallel strategy may be more expensive than the sequential strategy since much more
data are transferred from the two servers to the client who has then to perform the join op-
eration. The sequential strategy implies a sequential execution of the queries and may cause
privacy breaches since if the server receiving the values of attribute tid knows query q , then it
can infer what tuples satisfy the conditions evaluated on the other server.
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Parallel strategy Sequential strategy
rs1 := select tid, Name
1
from F e
1
where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’
rs1 := select tid, Name
1
from F e
1
where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’
rs2 := select tid, Name
2
from F e2
where County=‘Napa’
rs2 := select tid, Name
2
from F e2
where County=‘Napa’ and tid in {4,6}
rc := select Name
1 ⊕ Name2 as Name
from rs1 join rs2 on
rs1 .tid=rs2.tid
rc := select Name
1 ⊕ Name2 as Name
from rs1 join rs2 on
rs1 .tid=rs2 .tid
Figure 9: An example of query translation in the non-communicating servers scenario
Example 3.3. Consider relation Patients in Figure 7(a), the set of constraints over it in
Figure 7(b), and the fragments in Figure 8. Suppose that a client formulates query q = se-
lect Name from Patients where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’ and County=‘Napa’, returning the
names of patients living in the Napa county and suffering from diabetes. The conditions operat-
ing at the different parties are: Conds1={Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’}, Conds2={County=‘Napa’},
and Cond c=∅, respectively. Figure 9 illustrates the translation of query q in the queries, for
both the parallel and sequential strategies, operating at each server and at the client side. Here,
we denote with rs1, rs2, and rc the results of queries qs1, qs2, and q c, respectively. The set {4,6}
appearing in qs2 of the sequential strategy represents the identifiers of the tuples in r s1, that is,
the tuples with Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’.
3.3 Multiple fragments
The main limitation of the solution in [1] is that it relies on the absence of communication
between the two storage servers. This assumption is clearly difficult to satisfy in a real world
scenario where a collusion between the servers or the users accessing the data can cause pri-
vacy breaches. To overcome this problem, in [9] the authors present a solution where several
fragments can be all stored at the same server.
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3.3.1 Data organization
Confidentiality constraints are enforced by fragmenting the original relation R into a set of
unlinkable fragments. The enforcement of association constraints via fragmentation is always
possible since the number of fragments composing F is not fixed a priori. As a consequence,
if an attribute cannot be inserted into an existing fragment without violating a confidentiality
constraint, a new fragment is created and the attribute is inserted in it. All attributes that do
not appear in a singleton constraint can then be represented in the clear in a fragment in F ,
thus improving query execution efficiency. Furthermore, we say that F maximizes visibility ,
since encryption is only applied to protect the values of attributes appearing in singleton con-
straints. A fragmentation F = {F 1, . . . ,F n} is correct with respect to a set C of confidentiality
constraints if: i) ∀c ∈ C, ∀F ∈ F , c 6⊆ F , and ii) ∀F i,F j ∈ F , i 6= j, F i ∩ F j = ∅. The first
condition states that a fragment cannot contain in the clear attributes that form a confidential-
ity constraint. The second condition states that the fragments must be disjoint. In this way,
the fragments composing a fragmentation can be stored at the same external server, since they
cannot be joined to reconstruct the content of the original relation.
At the physical level, each fragment F i={Ai1 , . . . , Ain}∈F translates into a physical frag-
ment F ei (salt ,enc,Ai1 , . . . , Ain), where attribute salt is the primary key of F
e
i and contains a
randomly chosen value, and attribute enc represents the encryption of the attributes in R that
do not belong to the fragment (i.e., R \ F i), combined before encryption in a binary xor with
the salt to prevent frequency attacks [43].
Example 3.4. Consider relation Patients in Figure 7(a) and the set of confidentiality con-
straints over it in Figure 7(b). An example of correct fragmentation that maximizes visibility is
F={{Name}, {DoB, County}, {Diagnosis, Prescription}}. Figure 10 illustrates the physical
fragments storing F . Note that the unique attribute in relation Patients that does not appear
in the clear in any fragment is SSN, since it forms a singleton constraint (c0).
Given a relation R and a set of well defined constraints C over it, different correct fragmen-
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F e1
salt enc Name
s11 α Anne
s1
2
β Beth
s13 γ Cheryl
s1
4
δ Doris
s1
5
ε Evelyn
s16 ζ Flora
F e2
salt enc DoB County
s21 ϑ 55/01/23 Alameda
s2
2
ι 86/04/05 Fresno
s23 κ 40/12/23 Napa
s2
4
λ 81/07/22 Napa
s2
5
µ 65/10/03 Orange
s26 ν 89/03/24 Trinit
F e3
salt enc Diagnosis Prescription
s31 τ HIV Nevirapine
s3
2
υ Anemia Folic acid
s33 φ Arthritis Anti-inflammatory
s3
4
ϕ Diabetes Insulin
s3
5
χ HeartAttack Anticoagulants
s36 ς Diabetes Insulin
Figure 10: An example of correct fragmentation in the multiple fragments scenario
tations that guarantee maximal visibility may exist. For instance, a fragmentation F where
each attribute that does not appear in a singleton constraint is stored in a different fragment
is correct and guarantees maximal visibility. Such a fragmentation however makes query exe-
cution inefficient. In fact, the evaluation of any query operating on more than one attribute
always requires the client involvement. It is then essential to determine a correct fragmentation
maximizing visibility and limiting the query evaluation burden for the client. The following
metrics have been proposed to measure the quality of a fragmentation.
• Number of fragments [9]. A straightforward approach for computing a fragmentation that
reduces the query evaluation costs consists in minimizing the number of fragments. The
rationale is that with a low number of fragments, more attributes in clear are stored in
the same fragment, thus allowing a more efficient query execution.
• Affinity between attributes [13]. The quality of a fragmentation can be measured in terms
of the affinity between pairs of attributes, which is represented through a traditional
affinity matrix. A fragmentation with high affinity is likely to reduce the query evaluation
costs at the client side.
• Query cost function [11]. If the expected query workload for R is known, a specific cost
function that models the cost of evaluating queries on F can be precisely defined and
minimized.
The problem of computing a fragmentation that minimizes the workload of query execution
at the client side with respect to the three metrics above is NP-hard (either the minimum
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hypergraph coloring or the minimum hitting set problems reduce to it [9, 11, 13]). The heuristic
algorithms proposed for solving such a problem are all based on the definition of a partial order
relationship, called dominance relationship and denoted , on fragmentations. A fragmentation
F ′ dominates a fragmentation F , denoted FF ′, if F ′ can be obtained by merging two or more
fragments in F .
Example 3.5. Consider relation Patients in Figure 7(a), the set of constraints over
it in Figure 7(b), and the following two correct fragmentations that maximize visibil-
ity: F1={{Name}, {DoB, County}, {Diagnosis, Prescription}} and F2={{Name}, {DoB},
{County}, {Diagnosis, Prescription}}. Since F1 can be obtained by merging fragments
{DoB} and {County} in F2, F2F1.
Note that if FF ′, then F ′ is clearly composed of a lower number of fragments than F ,
its affinity is higher than the affinity of F , and the evaluation of a query cost function over
it results lower than the evaluation of the same function over F . The rationale is that if the
number of plaintext attributes in a fragment increases, then the affinity increases and the query
costs decrease. We can conclude that, given two fragmentations F and F ′, with FF ′, F ′ is
always more convenient than F , independently from the metric used to measure the quality
of the solution. The heuristics proposed in [9, 11, 13] aim therefore at computing a minimal
fragmentation that satisfies the following three conditions: i) F is correct; ii) F maximizes
visibility (i.e., association constraints are enforced through fragmentation only); and iii) there
is not another fragmentation F ′ that is correct, maximizes visibility, and that dominates F
(i.e., FF ′). The algorithms proposed in [9, 11, 13] work in polynomial time in the number of
attributes composing R and constraints in C.
3.3.2 Query execution
Like for the fragmentation model in [1], the query execution process must be revised. Since
each physical fragment F e represents, either plaintext or encrypted, all the attributes in R,
any query q operating on R can be evaluated accessing one physical fragment only. Consider
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a query q of the form select A from R where Cond, where A is a subset of attributes in
R, and Cond=
∧
i cnd i is a conjunction of basic predicates. The translation process consists
in first splitting Cond=
∧
i cnd i into two sets of conditions, depending on the attributes that
each basic condition in Cond involves and therefore on the party that can evaluate it. In
particular, if F e is the fragment chosen for query evaluation, Cond is split into: Cond s that
is the conjunction of basic conditions that involve only attributes plaintext represented in F e;
and Cond c that is the conjunction of basic conditions involving at least an attribute that is not
plaintext represented in F e. The external server then evaluates condition Cond s and returns
the tuples satisfying it to the client. The client decrypts attribute enc, evaluates Cond c, and
projects the resulting relation over the set A of attributes. We note that the choice of the
fragment on which query q must be evaluated should minimize the computational overhead at
the client side, and therefore limit the number of tuples satisfying Cond s that are returned to
the client. A possible strategy for choosing the fragment may consist in selecting the fragment
on which it is possible to directly execute the most selective conditions, to reduce the amount
of data returned to the client.
Example 3.6. Consider relation Patients in Figure 7(a), the set of constraints over it in
Figure 7(b), and the fragmentation in Figure 10. Suppose now that a client formulates query q
= select Name from Patients where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’ and County=‘Napa’ returning
the names of patients living in the Napa county and suffering from diabetes. The query can be
translated to operate on each of the three fragments, but the evaluation using either F e2 or F
e
3
is more convenient than using F e1, since they contain a subset of the attributes appearing in the
conditions of q . The translation of query q in the corresponding queries operating at the server
and at the client side, using either F e2 or F
e
3, are illustrated in Figure 11.
3.4 Departing from encryption
Although the solution illustrated in Section 3.3 limits the adoption of encryption to the at-
tributes that appear in singleton constraints, encryption carries the burden of key management
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Translation over F e2 Translation over F
e
3
rs := select salt , enc
from F e
2
where County=‘Napa’
rs := select salt , enc
from F e
3
where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’
rc := select Name
from Decrypt(rs.enc,rs.salt ,k)
where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’
rc := select Name
from Decrypt(rs.enc,rs.salt ,k)
where County=‘Napa’
Figure 11: An example of query translation in the multiple fragments scenario
and makes query execution expensive. In [10, 12] the authors propose an approach that com-
pletely departs from encryption. This proposal is based on the assumption that the data owner
is willing to store a small portion of the data to satisfy confidentiality constraints.
3.4.1 Data organization
Confidentiality constraints are enforced by fragmenting the original relation R into two frag-
ments F o and F s, where F o is stored at the data owner and F s is stored at the external
server. Intuitively, fragment F o contains sensitive attributes (singleton constraints) and at
least one attribute for each sensitive association. In this way, sensitive attributes as well as
sensitive associations are not exposed to the external server. A fragmentation F=〈F o,F s〉 is
correct with respect to a set C of confidentiality constraints if ∀c ∈ C, c 6⊆ F s. We note that
fragment F o does not need to satisfy this condition (i.e., F o can possibly violate constraints),
since it is stored at the owner side and only authorized users can access it. Furthermore,
to avoid loss of information, all attributes in R should be represented either in F o or in F s
(i.e., F o∪F s=R) (completeness property). At the physical level, fragmentation F=〈F o,F s〉
with F o = {Ao1 , . . . ,Aoi} and F s = {As1 , . . . ,Asj} translates into two physical fragments
F eo(tid,Ao1 ,. . . ,Aoi) and F
e
s(tid,As1 ,. . . ,Asj ). Attribute tid is the primary key of both physi-
cal fragments and guarantees the lossless join property (i.e., the correct reconstruction of the
original relation). It can be either: 1) the key attribute of R, if it does not violate confidentiality
constraints when added in F s, or 2) an attribute that is added to both F
e
o and F
e
s during the
fragmentation process. Note that the attributes stored in fragment F s should not be replicated
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F eo
tid SSN Name County
1 782619730 Anne Alameda
2 946294626 Beth Fresno
3 737260262 Cheryl Napa
4 937360965 Doris Napa
5 946259572 Evelyn Orange
6 837350362 Flora Trinity
F es
tid DoB Diagnosis Prescription
1 55/01/23 HIV Nevirapine
2 86/04/05 Anemia Folic acid
3 40/12/23 Arthritis Anti-inflammatory
4 81/07/22 Diabetes Insulin
5 65/10/03 HeartAttack Anticoagulants
6 89/03/24 Diabetes Insulin
Figure 12: An example of correct fragmentation departing from encryption
in F o (non-redundancy property) to avoid unnecessary storage at the data owner side and usual
replica management problems.
Example 3.7. Consider relation Patients in Figure 7(a) and the set of well defined constraints
over it in Figure 7(b). An example of a correct fragmentation is F o={SSN, Name, County}
and F s={DoB, Diagnosis, Prescription}. Figure 12 illustrates the corresponding physical
fragments, where an artificial tuple identifier has been added.
Constraint c0 is satisfied by storing attribute SSN in F o. Constraints c1, . . . , c4 are satisfied by
storing attribute Name in F o. Constraints c5 and c6 are satisfied by storing attribute County in
F o.
Given a relation R and a set of well defined confidentiality constraints C over it, there may
exist different fragmentations that are correct, complete, and non-redundant. For instance,
a fragmentation F=〈F o,F s〉, with F o=R and F s=∅, is correct, complete, and non-redundant
but it is clearly not acceptable since it corresponds to not outsourcing the data. It is then
needed to compute a fragmentation that minimizes the data owner’s workload in terms either
of storage, computation, or both. In [12] the authors illustrate the following metrics to measure
the quality of a fragmentation, which differ in the resource whose consumption should be min-
imized (storage vs computation) and on the information available about the system workload
at fragmentation time.
• Number of attributes : the cost of a fragmentation corresponds to the number of attributes
in F o.
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• Storage space: the cost of a fragmentation corresponds to the physical size of the attributes
in F o.
• Number of queries : the cost of a fragmentation corresponds to the number of queries that
involve at least one of the attributes in F o.
• Number of conditions : the cost of a fragmentation corresponds to the number of conditions
in queries that involve at least one of the attributes in F o.
The problem of computing a fragmentation that minimizes one of the metrics above-
mentioned is NP-hard (the minimum hitting set problem reduces to it [12]). A heuristic algo-
rithm has been proposed that solves the problem for any metric and works in polynomial time
with respect to the number of attributes in R.
3.4.2 Query execution
Similarly to the non-communicating servers approach, a query formulated by users on Rmust be
translated into queries operating on F eo and F
e
s. Consider a query q of the form select A from
R where Cond, where A is a subset of attributes in R, and Cond =
∧
i condi is a conjunction
of basic predicates. As for the fragmentation techniques previously described, condition Cond
is first split into: Condo that is the conjunction of basic conditions operating only on attributes
in F o; Cond s that is the conjunction of basic conditions involving only attributes in F s; and
Condso that is the conjunction of basic conditions involving both attributes in F o and F s.
Condition Conds can be pushed down to the server, while conditions Condo and Cond so are
executed at the owner side, possibly with the support of the server.
The evaluation of a query q can proceed according to the following two different strategies,
depending on the order in which conditions Conds, Condo, and Cond so are evaluated.
• Server-Owner strategy . The external server evaluates condition Conds, the data owner
then computes the join between the result returned by the external server and F o and
evaluates Condo and Cond so.
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Server-Owner strategy Owner-Server strategy
rs := select tid
from F e
s
where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’
ro := select tid
from F e
o
where County=‘Napa’
rso := select Name
from F eo join rs on
F e
o
.tid=rs.tid
where County=‘Napa’
rs := select tid
from F es
where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’ and
tid in {3,4}
rso := select Name
from F eo join rs on
F eo.tid=rs.tid
Figure 13: An example of query translation departing from encryption
• Owner-Server strategy . The data owner evaluates condition Condo and sends the pro-
jection over attribute tid to the external server. The external server evaluates condition
Conds on the subset of tuples indicated by the data owner. Finally, the data owner refines
the result received from the server, by evaluating condition Condso.
The choice between these two strategies should take into consideration, besides efficiency
in query evaluation, the fact that if query q is publicly available, the Owner-Server strategy
reveals to the server the tuples that satisfy condition Condo, thus possibly causing privacy
breaches.
Example 3.8. Consider relation Patients in Figure 7(a), the set of constraints over it in Fig-
ure 7(b), and the fragmentation in Figure 12. Suppose now that a client formulates query q =
select Name from Patients where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’ and County=‘Napa’ returning
the names of patients living in the Napa county and suffering from diabetes. The conditions oper-
ating at the different parties are: Cond s={Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’}, Condo={County=‘Napa’},
and Cond so=∅, respectively. The translation of q into the corresponding queries, for the Server-
Owner and Owner-Server strategies are illustrated in Figure 13. Set {3,4} used in query qs of
the Owner-Server strategy represents the identifiers of the tuples in r o, that is, of the tuples
with County=‘Napa’.
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4 Protecting data integrity
Besides protecting data confidentiality, it is also necessary to design mechanisms for protecting
the integrity and authenticity of the data. As a matter of fact, users as well as organizations
are increasing their dependency on data for their daily operations, thus making data integrity a
critical issue. Guaranteeing integrity means that techniques should be adopted to easily verify
that the external server does not improperly modify data in storage and that the server provides
a correct response to queries (i.e., the server does not delete or modify data improperly). In
this section, we illustrate the main techniques proposed to guarantee data integrity in storage
and query computation.
4.1 Integrity in storage
Data integrity can be provided at different granularity levels: table, attribute, tuple, or cell
level. The verification of the integrity at the table level and attribute level can be performed
by the client only if she receives the whole table/column. Data integrity at the cell level suffers
from a high verification overhead. For these reasons, the majority of the proposals in the lit-
erature provide data integrity at the tuple level and rely on digital signatures (e.g., [25]). The
data owner first signs, with her private key, each tuple t in a relation, and the signature is
concatenated to the corresponding tuple. The relation is then encrypted and outsourced to the
external server. When a client receives a set of tuples from the external server, she can check
the signature associated with the tuples to detect possible unauthorized changes to the data.
The main drawback of this solution is that the verification cost at the client side grows linearly
with the number of tuples in the query result. To limit this burden, in [34] the authors propose
the adoption of a schema that permits to combine the signature of a set of tuples in a unique
signature. To this purpose, the authors consider three different signature schemas: condensed
RSA encryption schema, a variation of traditional RSA encryption schema, which allows the
aggregation of signatures generated by the same signer; BGLS encryption schema [6] based on
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bilinear mappings, which supports the aggregation of signatures generated by different signers;
batch DSA signature aggregation whose verification is based on the multiplicative homomorphic
property of these signatures. The signature verification processes for the condensed RSA and
BGLS schemas are more efficient than the signature verification for the batch DSA schema.
Both condensed RSA and BGLS approaches are mutable, meaning that any user who knows
multiple aggregated signatures can compose them, obtaining a valid aggregated signature that
may correspond to the aggregate signature of an arbitrary set of tuples. Although this feature
can be of interest in the process of generating aggregated signatures, it also represents a weak-
ness for the integrity of the data. In [33], the authors propose an extension to condensed RSA
and BGLS techniques that makes them immutable. Such an extension is based on zero knowl-
edge protocols that allow a server to only reveal a proof of the knowledge of the aggregated
signature associated with a query result, instead of revealing the signature itself.
4.2 Integrity in query computation
In addition to provide assurance on the fact that data stored at external servers are protected
from unauthorized changes (data integrity in storage), it is also becoming more and more
important to guarantee the correctness and completeness of query results. The verification
of the integrity of data processing results is particularly difficult to implement, especially in
the emerging large-scale platforms used, for example, in cloud computing. The approaches
proposed in the literature can be classified in the following two categories.
• Authenticated data structures approaches (e.g., [19, 29, 31, 35, 36, 37, 50]) are based on the
definition of an appropriate data structure (e.g., a signature chaining, a Merkle hash tree,
or a skip list). These solutions provide completeness guarantee for the queries operating
on the attribute (set thereof) on which the data structure has been defined. Note that
all these approaches also guarantee data integrity in storage since unauthorized changes
to the data can be detected during the integrity verification process of query results.
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• Probabilistic approaches (e.g., [30, 46, 48]) are based on the insertion of sentinels in the
outsourced data, which must also belong to the query result. These solutions provide a
probabilistic guarantee of completeness of query results.
Authenticated data structures approaches. One of the first solutions is the signature
chaining approach [35, 36], which has been proposed to verify the completeness of the result of
range queries. Given an attribute A defined over domain D and characterized by a total order
relationship, the content of the outsourced relation is ordered with respect to the value that
attribute A assumes in each tuple. The signature associated with each tuple t i is then computed
by signing the string resulting from the concatenation of h(t i−1) with h(t i), where h is a one-
way hash function and t i−1 is the tuple preceding t i in the order defined by attribute A over
the outsourced relation. If the result of a range query operating on attribute A is not complete
since one tuple, say t i, has been omitted by the external server, the signature verification
process reveals that the result is not complete. In fact, during the verification process, the
client computes a signature for tuple t i+1, that is h(t i−1)||h(t i+1), which is different from the
original signature associated with t i+1 (i.e., h(t i)||h(t i+1)). The main limitation of this solution
is that it guarantees the completeness of the query result only with respect to the attribute
on which the signature chain has been defined. A signature chain has to be defined for each
attribute that may be involved in a range query. As a consequence, the size of the signature
associated with each tuple, and therefore also the time necessary for its verification, increases
linearly with the number of signature chains.
Other approaches are based on the definition of a Merkle hash tree [31]. A Merkle hash
tree is a binary tree, where the leaves contain the hash of one tuple of the outsourced relation,
and each internal node contains the result of the application of a one-way hash function on the
concatenation of the children of the node itself. The root of the Merkle hash tree is signed by
the data owner and communicated to authorized users. The tuples in the leaves of the tree
are ordered according to the value of a given attribute A. Figure 14 illustrates an example of
a Merkle hash tree built over relation Patients in Figure 1(a) for attribute Name. Whenever
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Figure 14: An example of Merkle hash tree
the external server evaluates a range query operating on A, it returns to the requesting client
the result of the query along with a verification object (VO) including all the information that
the client needs to know to verify the completeness of the query result [19]. In particular, the
computation of the verification object depends on the type of query submitted to the server.
For instance, in case of a selection query that returns a specific tuple, the verification object
includes the values of all the nodes that are sibling of the nodes in the path from the leaf
corresponding to the returned tuple to the root of the tree. The content of the verification
object is necessary to recompute the value of the root and to verify whether the computed
value is equal to the value originally signed by the data owner. If the comparison succeeds, the
query result is correct; it is not correct, otherwise. For instance, with respect to the Merkle
hash tree in Figure 14, the verification object for a query that returns the patient whose name
is Beth (i.e., tuple t2) is represented by gray nodes in the figure. After the proposal in [19],
many different solutions have been presented with the goal of improving the efficiency of the
verification process [29, 37] and to support join operations [50]. Like for signature chaining,
also the adoption of Merkle hash trees requires the definition of a different data structure for
each attribute that can be involved in a query.
Since Merkle hash trees cannot efficiently support updates to the outsourced data, in [20]
the authors propose to use an authenticated skip list for verifying the completeness of query
results. A skip list is a hierarchical data structure that stores an ordered list of elements and
efficiently supports the search, insertion, and removal of elements in the list. The proposal
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in [20] consists in representing through a relational table, called security table, the skip list
built over the outsourced relation R. To prove the completeness of a query, the user checks the
value of few tuples in the security table. In [20], the authors describe different techniques for
efficiently querying the security table and illustrate how skip lists easily support updates to the
outsourced relation.
Probabilistic approaches. The solutions based on the definition of an authenticated data
structure have the advantage that they provide a guarantee of the completeness of query results
with absolute certainty. The main problem however is that these data structures can be used
only for the specific attribute on which they are built. This implies that the completeness of
queries operating on different attributes cannot be checked. To solve this problem, probabilistic
approaches allow a client to verity the completeness of any query result with high probability,
reducing also the performance overhead. In [48] the authors propose a probabilistic approach
based on the insertion of fake tuples in the relations before outsourcing them. When a client
receives the query result, it checks whether the fake tuples that satisfy the conditions specified
in the query belong to the result. If at least a fake tuple is missing, the query result is not
complete. Clearly, fake tuples must be indistinguishable at the server’s eye from real tuples,
since otherwise the server could compute the query result only on the fake tuples without being
discovered. As proved in [48], even a limited number of fake tuples ensures high probabilistic
guarantee of completeness. The approach in [48] operates on relational databases and has been
then extended to operate on XML data collections [30].
In [46] the authors propose an alternative approach based on the replication, and encryption
with a different key, of a subset of the outsourced tuples. The original encrypted tuples as well
as the duplicated tuples are then mixed all together and stored in the same relation. A query
submitted by the client is translated into two queries determined by applying the two different
encryption keys, and then they are executed on the whole encrypted relation. The client
compares the results obtained by the two queries and verifies whether they both contain the
same duplicate tuples. If a tuple that has been duplicated appears only in one of the two query
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results, the client can immediately infer that the server has omitted at least a tuple from the
result of one of these queries. Clearly, the server should not be able to determine the pairs of
tuples in the outsourced relation that represent the same plaintext tuple. Like for fake tuples,
the probabilistic guarantee of completeness increases with the number of duplicated tuples.
In [44], the authors present a completely different approach based on the pre-computation
of tokens associated with a batch of queries. Before outsourcing the database, the data owner
evaluates a set of queries on plaintext data and associates with each query a token computed
by applying a one-way cryptographic hash function to the query result concatenated with a
nonce. When the client submits a set of batch queries to the external server, it also includes
one of the tokens previously computed and associated with one query in the batch. The server
executes the queries in the batch and returns to the client the results of the queries along with
a token and the indication of the query to which the token is associated. Such a token has to
match the token previously sent from the client to the server. If this match succeeds, the client
knows that the server has executed all the queries in the batch and that the result of each query
is complete (because the server is not able to identify the query whose token is equal to those
received from the client).
Freshness. Recent proposals address the problem of guaranteeing the freshness [29] of query
results, meaning that queries are always executed on up-to-date data collections. In [49], the
authors propose a solution for both authenticated data structures and probabilistic approaches.
The basic idea behind the solution developed for the authenticated data structure approaches
is to include a timestamp, which is periodically updated, in the data structure itself. If a
client knows how frequently the timestamp is updated, she can check whether the received
verification object (and therefore the data) is up-to-date. For instance, the signature of the
root of a Merkle hash tree can be computed on the concatenation of the hash values of its
children with the timestamp. The external server cannot execute queries on old versions of
the data since a client, by checking the timestamp included in the signature of the root of the
Merkle hash tree, can detect whether the returned query result is based on up-to-date data. The
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solution proposed for probabilistic approaches adopting fake tuples [48] is based on periodically
changing, in a deterministic way, the fake tuples in the dataset (i.e., new and old fake tuples are
periodically added and deleted, respectively). If a client knows what are the current fake tuples
in the outsourced data, it can verify whether a query result includes all and only the valid fake
tuples that should be present in the instant of time when the query has been executed. At any
time, the fake tuples to be inserted or deleted are generated by functions that are shared with
clients.
5 Open issues
The data outsourcing scenario presents different security issues that need to be carefully ad-
dressed. Besides the problems described in this chapter, there are still other open issues and
challenges that require further investigation and that we briefly describe.
• Multiple relations. Most of the works in the data outsourcing scenario assume that out-
sourced information is stored in a single relation. An interesting open issue consists in
assuming that data are represented through a set of relations that can be possibly joined.
The definition of confidentiality constraints needs then to be extended to capture complex
requirements involving multiple relations. Analogously, the data integrity issues should be
further investigated. We note that there are some attempts that consider the integrity of
data resulting from the combination (join) of multiple tables. These solutions are however
at a preliminary stage and may result difficult to apply in a real world scenario, where
simplicity and efficiency are a must.
• Dynamic datasets. Solutions for protecting outsourced data typically consider static
datasets since the insertion/deletion of data can possibly cause privacy breaches. For
instance, the insertion of a tuple in a fragmented relation translates to the insertion of
a sub-tuple in each of the physical fragments stored at the external server(s). By moni-
toring updates to fragments, a malicious user can reconstruct the associations among the
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attributes represented in the clear in different fragments, thus violating confidentiality
constraints for the new tuple. It would be then interesting to extend current approaches
to support dynamic datasets.
• Multiple owners. In may real-world situations, the access restrictions on data arise from
the collaboration of multiple parties (owners) that have a say on the data. This situation
calls for novel solutions that should take into consideration the fact that the outsourced
data may have multiple owners that need to collaborate to provide an adequate protection.
• Selective write privileges. A common assumption of all the works in the data outsourcing
scenario is that write operations are permitted only to the owner of the data. This re-
striction however may not be applicable in many scenarios, where users need to cooperate
to reach a common goal. Therefore, it would be interesting to extend current approaches
for access control enforcement to support selective write privileges.
• Instance level protection requirements. Confidentiality constraints are defined at the
schema level and describe which attributes should not be released in combination. There
are however situations where associations are sensitive only when the involved attributes
assume specific values. For instance, the association between the name of a specific pa-
tient and her diagnosis can be considered sensitive only if the diagnosis reveals that the
patient suffers from a rare disease. Novel data protection techniques have then to be
developed that take into consideration also these instance level protection requirements.
• Private access. Most of the solutions that guarantee confidentiality in the data outsourc-
ing scenario are aimed at guaranteeing the privacy of remotely stored data. Another
important issue that still needs to be addressed is represented by query confidentiality.
In fact, a query submitted by a user can be possibly exploited for inferring sensitive in-
formation about the user. For instance, if a user accesses a medical database looking for
information related to a specific disease, the server can infer that the user (or a person
close to her) suffers from that disease. We note that the protection of query confidentiality
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requires the protection of access patterns as well: even if each query singularly taken can
be considered secure, the monitoring of a sequence of accesses may permit the server to
infer sensitive information.
6 Conclusions
Data outsourcing is emerging today as a successful paradigm for the efficient management
of huge data collections. As a consequence of this trend toward outsourcing, sensitive data
(or data that can be exploited for linking with sensitive data) are now stored on external
servers. Data confidentiality and data integrity can then be at serious risk. In this chapter, we
first provided an overview of recent proposals addressing the data confidentiality issues. We
described solutions based on encryption, a combination of encryption and fragmentation, and
the involvement of the data owner for storing a portion of the data. We then considered the
integrity issues and described different approaches that guarantee the integrity of the data in
storage and the correctness, completeness, and freshness of query results. We concluded the
chapter with an overview of the main open research challenges in the data outsourcing scenario.
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Exercises
Exercise 1. Consider relation Patients in Figure 1(a), its encrypted version in Fig-
ure 1(b), and query q = “select Diagnosis from Patients where DoB<1970 and
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County=‘Orange”’. Translate q in a query that can be executed by the external server on
the encrypted relation and determine the tuples returned by the server. Are there any spurious
tuples?
Exercise 2. Consider the following access matrix:
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
A 1 0 1 1 1 0
B 1 1 0 1 0 1
C 1 0 1 0 0 1
D 0 1 0 0 1 0
E 0 1 0 0 1 0
Determine a key derivation hierarchy by applying the heuristic algorithm described in Sec-
tion 2.3.
Exercise 3. Consider relation Citizen(SSN, Name, DoB, ZIP, Occupation, Annual Income)
and the confidentiality constraints: c0 = {SSN}, c1 = {Name, DoB, ZIP}, c2 = {Name, Annual
Income}, c3 = {DoB, ZIP, Annual Income}, c4 = {Occupation, Annual Income}.
Determine a correct and complete fragmentation of relation Citizen, according to the “non-
communicating servers” fragmentation approach (Section 3.2).
Exercise 4. Consider relation Citizen(SSN, Name, DoB, ZIP, Occupation, Annual Income)
and the confidentiality constraints: c0 = {SSN}, c1 = {Name, DoB, ZIP}, c2 = {Name, Annual
Income}, c3 = {DoB, ZIP, Annual Income}, c4 = {Occupation, Annual Income}.
Determine a correct and minimal fragmentation that maximizes visibility of relation Citizen,
according to the “multiple fragments” fragmentation approach (Section 3.3).
Exercise 5. Consider relation Citizen(SSN, Name, DoB, ZIP, Occupation, Annual Income)
and the confidentiality constraints: c0 = {SSN}, c1 = {Name, DoB, ZIP}, c2 = {Name, Annual
Income}, c3 = {DoB, ZIP, Annual Income}, c4 = {Occupation, Annual Income}.
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Determine a correct, complete, and non redundant fragmentation of relationCitizen, according
to the “departing from encryption” fragmentation approach (Section 3.4).
Exercise 6. Consider relation Patients in Figure 1(a) and its fragmentation in Figure 8.
Translate query q = select Name, Diagnosis from Patients where DoB>1980 and
County6=‘Napa’, by applying both the parallel and sequential strategies.
Exercise 7. Consider relation Patients in Figure 1(a) and its fragmentation in Figure 10.
Translate query q = select Name, DoB from Patients where Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’ and
County=‘Napa’ assuming to evaluate q on F e2 .
Exercise 8. Consider relation Patients in Figure 1(a) and its fragmentation in Figure 12.
Translate query q = select Name, Prescription from Patients where
Diagnosis=‘Diabetes’ and DoB<1985 assuming to evaluate q on F e3 .
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